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Enjoyment as an Aesthetic Factor: The Specificity of the Aesthetic
in Late Marxism
Geoff Boucher
Lately, it has become as imperative to separate aesthetics and politics as it once was
to link them. Many progressive literary critics have begun to react against the
disturbing tendency in a lot of contemporary criticism to reduce the artwork to an
allegory of political power.1 But equally, these critics wish to avoid the problematic
regression to moralizing forms of criticism, or a revival of aesthetic categories bereft
of historical context, that the ‘turn to ethics’ and the ‘turn to aesthetics’ promote.
In a series of new positions, leftwing thinkers have sought to retain the idea of a
cultural politics without sacrificing the conceptualization of aesthetic autonomy.2
Although his own position has recently become highly ambiguous on the question of
aesthetic autonomy – often reducing artworks to instances of political ideology or
illustrations for theoretical positions – among the most influential of the thinkers
to endorse this new departure is Slavoj Zˇizˇek.3
From the perspective of contemporary forms of dialectical social theory, however,
the desired theorization must grasp the specificity of the aesthetic in relation to the
category of totality, that is, in a mediated relation to politics. Yet the negative
project of steering between the Scylla of a reductive politicization of aesthetics and
the Charybdis of a reactionary aestheticization of politics can no longer fully define
the coordinates of the desired solution. Such a theorization will only be successful
when it can specify the relative autonomy of aesthetic categories such as form and
content, together with the medium-specific categories demanded by the object,
without reducing the aesthetic to the political, renouncing the political implications
of aesthetics, or regressing behind the critique of metaphysics.
It is this last condition that determines that the debates on ‘aesthetics and politics’
of the 1930s – debates between Kantian and Hegelian approaches played out in the
terms of historical materialism between (respectively) Adorno and Luka´cs – cannot
provide a contemporary orientation.4 The Kantian position on the analogical
connection between practical freedom and the interplay of the faculties in aesthetic
judgement relied, in itsMarxist appropriation, on the idea that the artwork projected
the realization of freedom as a teleological goal latent in (human) nature, and so art
supplied the regulative ideal without which politics would be blind. This is the full
significance of Adorno’s claim that ‘politics has migrated into autonomous
artworks’.5 The Hegelian-Marxist position, by contrast, inverted Hegel’s own
claim regarding the end of art tomaintain that the continued existence of the artwork
as a reconciled totality (an organic whole, that is, a beautiful object) represented a
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denunciation of the alienated society. For Luka´cs, the diegetic world of the realist
work represented the lived experience of everyday reality not through description of
alienated appearances, but through the narrative reconstruction of social processes as
the results of human agency by typical individuals.6 This reconstruction of the human
essence meant that the realist work had the ability to catalyse knowledge of the
totality, ethical regeneration and new feelings, because it indicated the possible
transformation of the ‘entire individual’ into the ‘person as a whole’.7 Magnificent
though they are, the problem with these positions is their reliance on teleological
conceptions of the historical process – either as latent goal or regulative ideal – for an
excessively emphatic notion of the ‘politics of art’.
Instead, contemporary forms of political criticism – when they remain connected to
historical materialism at all – generally depart from the anti-teleological Structural
Marxism of Althusser and co-thinkers, especially fromAlthusser’s essay on ‘ideological
state apparatuses’ and its sequels in film criticism and literary theory. Through its
conception of the relative autonomy of the ‘structural instances’ of economics, politics
and ideology (and therefore aesthetics), not only did Structural Marxism make
possible ‘regional theories’ of different social practices, it also stipulated a strict
conception of the ‘specificity of the aesthetic,’ based on its functional difference and
historical distinctness from the political and the ideological.8 Where politics meant the
reproduction (and transformation) of the unity of the social totality – or ‘social
formation’ – in the confrontations of social classes centred on the state, ideologymeant
the reproduction (and transformation) of the social subjectivity of human agents
performing functional roles.9 By contrast with politics and ideology, which had social
functions, art emerged through ‘internal distantiation’ from ideology and consisted of
a sort of knowledge (knowledge of ideology) rather than a sort of functionality.10 But
despite the impressive potentials of this position, it soon produced a species of
functional reductionism – perfectly expressed in the notion of an ‘ideology of the
aesthetic’ – that returned the artwork from its hard-won autonomy to being merely a
supplement to politics. Even the most sophisticated post-Althusserian literary
criticism, that of Fredric Jameson, tends to regress to functional reductionism with the
claim that the artwork is all about cultural de-programming and re-programming.
Is it possible to conceptualise the specificity of the aesthetic by rethinking the research
programme of Structural Marxism, thereby refusing the over-politicisation of
aesthetics without regressing to metaphysical ideas of the social totality? I propose
that the significance of Zˇizˇek’s conceptual breakthrough in the field of post-
Althusserian theories of ideology is that it indicates the necessity for a dual perspective
analysis. According to this position, the social formation is both a ‘structural
framework’ – an heterogeneous functional ensemble of structural instances – and
‘ethical life’ – an homogeneous intersubjective totality of social practices. Although
this position radically revises the Althusserian understanding of the social formation,
it actually explains the insight present in Althusser’s own declaration that mutual
recognition is ideology. This is, of course, provided that we consider mutual
recognition not from the structural framework perspective of the ideological
interpellation of subjects, but from the ethical life perspective of ideology as the lived
experience of social agents involved in struggles around social practices. I then
propose that the aestheticmeditates on ethical life as awhole. Again, this accordswith
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Althusser’s intuition that ideology cannot be counted amongst the ideologies,
although it has a special relation to ideology. The aesthetic is an anthropocentric form
of knowledge – that is, a body of subject-centred representations lacking a functional
significance – that is in a constant, that is, historical, tension with the ideological field
from which it emerges.
Within this radical reconceptualisation of Structural Marxism, I want to make
explicit the distinction between the struggles around social practices that constitute
ethical life, which I follow Ernesto Laclau and ChantalMouffe in describing in terms
of ‘hegemonic articulations,’ and the aesthetic. I do this by pointing to a significant
difference between ‘enjoyment as a political factor’, where ideological hegemony is
cemented by libidinal investments in social exclusions, and what I call ‘enjoyment as
an aesthetic factor’, where these libidinal investments are worked through in ways
that expose the historically contingent character of ideological hegemony. This
distinction between hegemonic ideology and aesthetic representations is reflected in
the different prominence of the formation of the universal through the repression of
fantasy (politics) and the formation of the particular around the exhibition of fantasy
(art). Accordingly, Zˇizˇek’s position can be reconstructed as grasping the specificity of
the aesthetic within a dialectical social theory that develops the Structural Marxist
research programme with Lacanian insights.
I am not particularly concerned by the fact that Zˇizˇek does not express himself in
these terms – especially not lately – and that Zˇizˇek’s own interpretive practice is often
a travesty of the specificity of the aesthetic. My intent is not an explication of Zˇizˇek’s
theory but a reconstruction of StructuralMarxism after Zˇizˇek.What I need to do is to
show that the proposed theoretical extension of the Althusserian research programme
solves conceptual problems within Structural Marxism and that Zˇizˇek’s conceptions
of the Lacanian subject and mutual recognition, considered as rectifications of this
field, yield the required dual perspective theory (Part I). Next I need to show how the
limitations of the post-Althusserian conceptualisation of the specificity of the aesthetic
were consequences of the problems in Structural Marxism that the perspective of
ethical life is to solve, through an examination of Jameson’s thesis on the ‘political
unconscious’ (Part II). Finally, I need to demonstrate, through a selective reading of
Zˇizˇek’s interpretive practice, how integration of the perspective of ethical life corrects
the limitations of Jameson’s position and yields the required conception of the
specificity of the aesthetic (Part III).
I
What Robert Resch’s superb reconstruction of the Althusserian research programme
in social theory – or, ‘Structural Marxism’ – inadvertently demonstrates is that,
despite significant progress, Althusser and co-thinkers did not satisfactorily resolve
the well-known tension between ‘economic determination in the final instance’ and
‘class struggle’.11 Briefly, with the concept of ‘structural causality’, Structural
Marxism successfully conceptualised the social formation as a decentred ensemble of
(functionally differentiated) structural instances and then, on this basis, managed to
rethink historical transformations as the clash of heterogeneous structural elements,
parallax
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generated by the internal dynamics of the relatively autonomous structural
instances.12 But this conceptualisation of ‘history as a process without a subject or a
goal’, withinwhich the individual is amere bearer of structural functions, sat uneasily
with Althusser’s declaration of conformity to the orthodox Marxist perspective that
‘class struggle is the motor of history’.13 Furthermore, Althusser’s contradictory
insistence that the (synchronic) functional structural instances were also forms of
(diachronic) social practices highlighted the problematic conjunction of a
functionally-integrated ‘structural eternity’ of social reproduction with an open-
ended transformation and contestation of dialogically-constituted social practices.14
The first problem was that class struggle involves a subject actively making history
according to its ideological goals – in contradiction with the basic functionalism of
structural causality. Althusser’s celebrated theories of ideological interpellation and
political overdetermination sought to resolve these problems. But these problems were
compounded by the fact that the transformation of social practices must happen
‘in ideology’, because according to Althusser, in order to act as social agents, human
beingsmustmisrecognise their performance of functional roles as the practical freedom
of individual subjects.15 If class struggle and social practices are to bemore than just the
‘necessary illusions’ of compliant drones, if they are to be considered social realitieswith
historical effects, then ideologicalmisrecognition andpolitical contestationmust have a
significantly greater autonomy from functional requirements than the original theory
allowed. Departing from Althusser’s sketched notes on politics and ideology, then,
Nicos Poulantzas and Ernesto Laclau sought to work out theories of political struggle
and ideological hegemony to supplement the structural perspective. Both postulated a
homogeneous medium, said to be a structural effect of the social formation, within
which social agents either fought for the unity of the social formation through
group representations ofmaterial interests as ‘social classes’ (politics – Poulantzas),16 or
struggled over the interpretation of representations of those ‘hegemonic’ universal
values (national-popular, democratic-liberal) determining the contours of subjectivity
(ideology – Laclau).17 But both folded these ideas about struggle back into the
structural framework by considering these to be regional theories of particular
structural instances – that is, as belonging to a functional compartment.
The second problem was that Althusser’s theory of interpellation, although
influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, lacks a developed concept of symbolic
identification, or, more devastatingly, that interpellation ‘trails Lacanian resonances
without real theoretical correspondence’.18 Althusser’s concept of interpellation
involved the formation of political subjects through their ideological ‘hailing’ by the
state machinery in the process of education, parliamentary democracy, civic life and
so forth.19 According to Althusser imaginary misrecognition was entailed in the
process whereby the ‘subjects’ engaged in mutual recognition of one another because
of their identification with what he called ‘the Subject’.20 Although this social-
theoretical appropriation of (Lacan’s interpretation of) Freud’s thesis on
group psychology misleadingly describes the ego as the ‘subject’ and the Ego Ideal
as the ‘Subject’, that is the least of its problems.
For Althusser, the mystification inherent in ideology springs from an imaginary,
egocentric misrecognition of decentred structures, not, as in classical Marxism, from
Boucher
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a motivated distortion of economic relations. The problem with Althusser’s account
was that the process of interpellation appeared to be completely successful – the
subjectwhowas a ‘mere bearer of structures’ (inAlthusser’s phrase)21 seemednothing
more than a ‘cultural dupe of the utmost imbecility’.22 To resolve this problem, the
postmarxian sequel to Althusser cut itself entirely adrift from the structural
framework, to propose a theory of the hegemonic articulation of ideologico-political
discourse. According to the perspective worked out in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
the hegemonic ideologico-political field was riven by ‘social antagonism’ based on
symbolic identifications with contending ‘master signifiers’, that is, social norms that
form individuals’ Ego Ideals.23 Because of the internal reference of any identification
to its excluded ‘constitutive outside’, or social antagonist, ideological interpellation is
always incomplete and open to contestation.24 Although Laclau and Mouffe’s effort
to discover an homogenousmediumwithwhich the reproduction and transformation
of social practices involved rejection of theAlthusserian programme, I have elsewhere
argued that in fact their perspective only avoids idealismwhere considered against the
background of an open conception of the structural framework.25
Certainly Zˇizˇek, in his virtuoso exposition of the Lacanian interpretation of ideological
interpellation in Chapter Three of The Sublime Object of Ideology, never for a moment
considers hegemonic articulations as something set aside from Althusserian Marxism.
According to Zˇizˇek, however, the dimension ‘beyond interpellation’ that subverts
every ideological form of social subjectivity arises not only from the potential conflicts
between contending ego ideals, but also from the unbridgeable gulf between subjection
to the signifier and the materiality of the body.26 By contrast with post-Althusserian
theory, then, Zˇizˇek proposes to concentrate not only on the symbolic dispersion of an
imaginary unity, but also on the real subversion of a symbolic network.27
The Lacanian interpretation of Althusser therefore involves two significant
rectifications to the concept of ideological interpellation.
(1) Zˇizˇek effectively reverses Althusser’s formula of the ‘interpellation of
individuals into subjects’ to suggest that ideology really interpellates subjects
into individuals. The entry of the infant into culture involves an act of repression
that creates the unconscious subject even as this subject is reified, ‘imprisoned’,
forced to interact with the world through the agency of the ego.Where the ego
belongs to the register of the Imaginary, the subject belongs to the Symbolic.
I shall refer to this from now on as the ‘Imaginary/Symbolic level’.
(2) Subjectivation also involves what might be called the interpellation of human
bodies into subjects.When the body is subjected to the SymbolicOrder, its linear,
instinctual satisfactions are warped into the rotary motion of the drives.
The infant’s libidinal investments (hereafter, enjoyment) is mostly evacuated,
reduced to the remainders of the erogenous zones.Where the subject belongs to
the register of the Symbolic, then, the drives (and the enjoyment they afford)
belong to the register of the Real. I shall refer to this from now on as the
‘Symbolic/Real level’.
Drawing on the Lacanian theory of the subject, Zˇizˇek reconstructs the mechanism
of ideological interpellation with reference to Lacan’s ‘Graph of Desire’.28 Designed
parallax
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to replace the Freudian topography of the ego, superego and id, Lacan’s topology
formalises the fundamental structure of the ‘subject of the signifier’. The Graph
represents the imaginary identity and symbolic identifications of the subject, together
with the ‘subversion of the subject’ through the logic of unconscious desire, driven by
theReal of libidinal investments, or ‘enjoyment’. TheGraph ofDesire can be regarded
as consisting of two analytically distinct, but actually connected levels, which broadly
correspond to the distinction between the statement (the Imaginary/Symbolic level)
and the enunciation (the Symbolic/Real level).29 Paradigmatically, the two levels of
Lacan’s graph represent the permanent gap between the enunciation and the state-
ment,30 recast by Zˇizˇek in terms of the illocutionary force (the performative dimension)
and the locutionary content (the constative dimension) of that speech act by which a
person assumes a social mandate.31 These levels can be represented as follows:
The critical thing is that just as the Imaginary/Symbolic level of the statement is
fundamentally incomplete (because of the lack of a final signifier to definitively
specify the locution), the Symbolic/Real level of the enunciation is internally
inconsistent (because of the impossibility of indicating the ultimate referent that is
nonetheless presupposed by any illocution). They are both open, perforated by the
lack of a final signifier and the loss of an ultimate object. This is a double blow to the
Althusserian position: the only level dealt with by Althusser, the imaginary/symbolic
level, is open and not closed; and this is because its instability can only be contained
by closure of the symbolic/real level, a level not even broached by Althusser.
For Zˇizˇek, the only way that ideology can temporarily ‘close up’ and sustain a
successful interpellation is when it brings the two levels – the Imaginary/Symbolic
level of identification and the Symbolic/Real level of enjoyment – into alignment.
It does this through what Zˇizˇek calls the ‘social fantasy’, a socialised version of
Lacan’s ‘fundamental fantasy’. The social fantasy connects the libidinal investments
of the human being with the symbolic identifications of the social subject through a
paradoxical ‘object-cause of desire’, or utopian image of complete satisfaction. This is
the significance of Zˇizˇek’s contention that ‘the last support of the ideological effect . . .
is the non-sensical, pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment’ and that ‘an ideology
implies, manipulates . . . a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy’.32
It appears to the interpellated subject that their Ego Ideal – or master signifier –
represents the fullness of society, a prospect of social harmony, because this imaginary
representation of the social totality, or I(O), imaginary Other, contains a utopian
promise of happiness, a ‘sublime object of ideology’, or object (a).
But even this achievement is precarious and therefore transient. This is because, on
the one hand, subjects engage in struggle to attain this utopian satisfaction through
Symbolic/Real level (enunciation): decentring, loss
– the interpellation of human bodies into subjects
Imaginary/Symbolic level (statement): division, lack
– the interpellation of subjects into individuals
Figure 1. The two levels of the Lacanian subject.
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their efforts to have their demands realised within the framework of the imaginary
Other. On the other hand, the subject projects anxiety about the loss of this promised
happiness onto the social antagonist who is the external referent, or constitutive
outside, of the Ego Ideal, in the form of the ‘unconscious logic of the theft of
enjoyment’. For instance, in symbolic identification with the master signifier
‘America’, the subject internalises a social ideal that becomes a reference point in
struggles for recognition that happen in the name of the ‘pursuit of happiness’, and
externalises their anxiety about the impossibility of this quest onto the enemies of their
Nation, those who seem to threaten the happiness of this way of life.
In Althusser’s terms, what this means is that mutual recognition is strife – it is a
struggle dynamised by the desire for recognition that easily becomes a drive to
annihilate the other, where the precondition for an individual’s engagement in these
struggles for recognition is an unwritten agreement to exclude certain others from
mutual recognition altogether. Zˇizˇek dramatises this by means of the idea that the
social ideal, the imaginary Other, is always shadowed by a ‘social sinthome’, a
sublime object (a), that is the thing in contention in social struggles. His shorthand
for this situation is the idea of ‘enjoyment as a political factor’, the claim that
symbolic identification actually involves (repression of the subject’s) acceptance of
exclusions as part of the individual’s inclusion in the ‘spirit of community’.33
II
The implications of Zˇizˇek’s reconceptualisation of Althusserian interpellation (and
its post-Marxist extension in hegemonic articulation) in terms of the Lacanian
subject are highly significant. Ideological interpellation, considered as a functional
component of the structural framework, is a conditioning presupposition and transient
result of struggles for recognition played out in the medium of ethical life – that is, in
the field of hegemonic articulations – even though under the reifying pressures of the
structural framework, things appear the other way around. Furthermore, ethical life
is not only analytically independent of the structural framework because its
categories are different, but also ontologically distinct because the historically
contingent social antagonisms that dynamize recognition struggles are irreducible to
the structurally necessary relations amongst functional components. The most that
can be said is that the structural framework appears as a pre-supposition of ethical
life – in the form of the human needs that motivate speech acts as hegemonic
articulations34 – and as a result of the imaginary resolution of an real contradiction,
thanks to the social fantasy, in ideological interpellation.
Zˇizˇek’s theorisation of this antagonistic dual perspective analysis is summed up as his
theory of the ‘parallax view’, which differentiates his position from the complementary
dual perspective analysis of system and lifeworld of Habermas.35 Zˇizˇek argues for
instance that economic determination and social antagonism (or ‘class struggle’, as he
now prefers) are incommensurable perspectives: economic determination is to be
supplemented by class struggle; class struggle is to be limited by economic deter-
mination; but, actually, the two perspectives cannot be reconciled.36 The correct
position is not the ‘view fromnowhere’ that supersedes both, but the dialectical reversal
parallax
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of impossibility into a condition of possibility: the mutually opposed perspectives are
irreconcilable because of the society they model. In the structural framework, ethical
life appears as dysfunctional social agents, that is, as contingency. In ethical life, the
structural framework appears as human needs motivating social ideals, that is, as
possibility.
The notion of the aesthetic as simultaneously reification and utopia brings Zˇizˇek’s
insights into proximity with the synthesis of Hegelian dialectics and structural
Marxism of Fredric Jameson. In fact, Zˇizˇek is so highly influenced by Jameson, with
references to Jameson’s cultural theory peppering Zˇizˇek’s texts, that we have tomerely
isolate three major instances. Zˇizˇek adapts Jameson’s use of the Greimasian semiotic
rectangle and his interpretation of the ‘vanishing mediator’ as the ‘negation of the
negation’ to Zˇizˇek’s own Lacanian dialectics.37 Secondly, Zˇizˇek interprets Jameson’s
understanding of the triadic sequence of Realism-Modernism-Postmodernism, in the
context of a dialectic of reification and utopia, as relations to symbolic authority.38
Finally, Jameson’s methodological progression through three ‘horizons of interpret-
ation’ (the political, social and historical, corresponding to the Lacanian imaginary,
symbolic and real)39 is strikingly similar to Zˇizˇek’s recommendation that analysis
proceed through the stages of the imaginary and symbolic, and then the symbolic and
real.40 But what makes Zˇizˇek independently important is that, unlike Jameson, his
most productive work does not remain captured by the structural framework.
The conceptual background for Jameson’s work is the Althusserian research
programme in aesthetics. This involved an ambiguity, for in the Althusserian
research programme, aesthetics was considered a sub-structure of the ideological
instance.41 The literary text or cinematic work consisted of a subject-centred
production of representations of lived experience and therefore remained ideological.
But at the same time, it was acknowledged that many artworks subverted ideology
by refusing imaginary closure and the naturalisation of ideological representations.
Specifically, aesthetics was held to perform a double function. (1) As something
happening ‘in ideology’, it was a form of ideological interpellation – the imaginary
totality of the artwork was supposed to promote identification with the imaginary
totality or Ego Ideal projected by the work for the ideal reader or viewer. (2) At the
same time, the aesthetic was held to be an objectification of ideology that risked,
through exposure of ideological contradictions, a de-naturalisation of subjectivity
and the disclosure of the historicity of social relations. In other words, the artwork
could form its content, its social raw materials (lived experience, that is, ideological
representations), either as realism (as ideological mystification) or as modernism
(as ideological demystification). The big limitation of this research programme was
its frame in the science/ideology distinction: the work was an ‘imaginary solution to
real contradictions’, that is, a distorted representation of the structural framework.
At the limit of reductionism, this led to the idea of the ‘ideology of the aesthetic’ as a
supplement to politics: aesthetics supplied the ‘structure of feeling’ needed by
political ideologies to secure willed compliance to their forms of individuality.42
The best the novel or the film could do was something negative: by exposing
contradictions, the work de-naturalised ideology; by fragmenting subjectivity, the
work refused imaginary solutions. Thus, aesthetics acted as a supplement to political
ideology or a propaedeutic to scientific theory.
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In his most programmatic work,The Political Unconscious, Jameson is highly aware that
the Althusserian position is limited by the assumptions of structural functionalism to
the conclusion that the aesthetic must be considered as (at best) a defective sort of
science and (atworst) a formof cultural programming.TheAlthusserian description of
ideology as the ‘imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence’ erases the
symbolic mediation of the structural framework in cultural practices and so invites a
reductive collapse of ideological representations back onto their functional coordinates.
To prevent this sort of functionalist reduction, Jameson proposes that ‘the Real
[of historical transformations of the structural framework] itself necessarily passes
through its prior textualisation, its narrativisation in the political unconscious’43 and
that this involves a ‘dialectic of reification and utopia’ that necessarily has the potential
to point beyond the structural conditions of possibility for a narrative representation.44
In other words, Jameson is engaged in trying to square the circle of economic
determination and class struggle by inserting the historical narratives that make up a
symbolic mediation between imaginary misrecognition and structural conditions as a
distinct functional compartment of the structural framework, ‘the cultural’.45
In this context what is ‘political’ about the unconscious is that the symbolic
identifications constitutive of social subjectivity are held to be suspended in a narrative
that positions the individual as a member of a group engaged in historical
transformations of the social totality. On the one hand, Jameson draws upon a deeper
reading of Lacan than Althusser’s to argue that this historical narration must involve
the figuration of the libidinally invested human body, so that ideologymust necessarily
invoke the image of a utopian reconciliation of civilisation and libido, individual and
society, humanity and nature. This implies an aesthetic norm of the reconciled human
body as a utopian vision of social flourishing and natural integration, one that is always
linked to ideological images of the socialised individual. But on the other hand,
Jameson understands ‘reification’, the process of rationalisation described by Weber
and reinterpreted in a Marxist light by Luka´cs, as equivalent to psychic repression, so
that the fragmentation of cultural representations characteristic of the commodifica-
tion of culture results in the ‘repression’ of historical narrative into the unconscious.
As Sean Homer notes in his study of Jameson’s Marxist hermeutics, such a concept
of the political unconscious therefore depends on the equation of historical process
with the Lacanian Real. There are clear parallels between Lacan’s orders of the
imaginary, symbolic and the real, and Jameson’s horizons of text as imaginary
resolution, socially symbolic act and the unrepresented history. But, as Homer says,
‘Jameson’s horizons of interpretation trail Lacanian resonances but there is no
correspondence between them in any meaningful sense’.46 Moreover, reification as
repression implies an expressive totality because history as political unconscious
must consist of a ‘periodisation corresponding to the succession of one dialectical
totality after another’.47 More brutally, the Hegelian-Marxist teleological
philosophy of history is the repressed content of Jameson’s ‘political unconscious’,
or, more precisely, every unconscious is political because it involves a teleological
historical narrative, albeit not necessarily the preferred, Hegelian-Marxist one.48
Jameson hopes, then, to avoid the teleological history of classical Marxism and the
functional reductionism of StructuralMarxism by making teleological history into the
parallax
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ideologicalmisrecognition required by social agents in the structural perspective, while
insisting that historical narrative, as a creative response to structural conditions,
includes the possibility of militant subjectivity as well as compliant socialisation. He
proposes that the work of art is a socially symbolic act because it dialogically projects
the imaginary solution to real contradictions that is preferred by a partisan social
group. Marxist hermeneutics therefore decodes the work through three horizons
(Imaginary, Symbolic and Real), seeking to disclose the repressed historical narrative
that motivates the text as a response to structural conditions. The first horizon
coincides with the political history of the individual text and is grasped as a symbolic
act, specifically, as an imaginary resolution of a social contradiction. This ‘symbolic
enactment of the social within the formal and aesthetic’ means the aesthetic work is at
oncemerely imaginary and a social intervention.49 The second horizon defines the text
as anutterancewithin the dialogical realm of class discourses centred on an ideologeme
– theminimal unit of ideology, which can be a pseudo-idea or proto-narrative, as in the
thematics of ressentiment in the writings of Nietzsche and Gissing – which positions
narrative within an ‘ultimate class fantasy about the “collective characters” which are
the classes in opposition’.50 The final horizon situates the text in relation to the socio-
historical totality: the antagonistic register of class discourses is revealed as a shared
horizon of meaning ‘which thus characterises the larger unity of the social system’ and
narrative turns out to be all about taking positions on structural transformations.51
This construction vitiates Jameson’s otherwise highly suggestive position, because it
merely substitutes an expressive ‘imaginary repression of narrative history’ for the
functionalist ‘imaginary resolution of structural contradictions’. Accordingly, the
symbolic mediation through narrative forms collapses into symbolic messages about
the coexistence of various sign systems, themselves ‘traces or anticipations of modes
of production’.52 The sequence of period styles Realism-Modernism-Postmodern-
ism, for instance, is grasped in terms of the de-programming and re-programming of
the lifeworld for the (overdetermining) functional requirements of the economic
instance, so that the sequence loosely corresponds to the series liberal-monopoly-
multinational capitalism.53 The consequence of this conception of the relation
between literary narrative and the structural framework as ‘economically
overdetermined’ ‘cultural revolution’ is that Jameson’s ‘rehabilitation of allegorical
criticism’ in The Political Unconscious morphs into the reduction of the artwork to an
allegory of politics. Despite insights into the ways in which the sequence of realism,
modernism and postmodernism represents a dialectical and reflexive totalisation of
aesthetic technique and social knowledge, ultimately it allegorises the series liberal,
monopoly and multinational capitalism.
III
The problems with Jameson’s thesis of the ‘political unconscious’ spring from
insufficient separation between cultural narratives and the structural framework of the
social formation. As an effect of structural causality, Jameson’s homogeneous medium
collapses into just another structural instance with an only ambiguous differentiation
from ideology. But if the concept of ethical life as an alternative perspective on the
social formation is to solve this problem for cultural theory, then it must yield an
Boucher
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emphatic concept of the specificity of the aesthetic. Given the proximity of Zˇizˇek and
Jameson, how is the notion of ethical life that Zˇizˇek makes possible going to enable
reconstruction of Jameson’s three interpretive horizons in ways that make a clear
distinction between aesthetics and ideology? In other words, what are the implications
for aesthetics of the proposed ‘parallax view’ of the social formation?
The basic answer to these questions is that art is a mimetic mode of knowledge that
reflects ethical life rather than the structural framework. It has already been argued
that the social antagonisms driving struggles for mutual recognition cannot be
reduced to the functional requirements of ideological interpellation and that
therefore a dual perspective is justified. It now remains to be established that the
aesthetic cannot be re-absorbed into the hegemonic articulations of ideologico-
political master signifiers that constitute ethical life, that is, that the aesthetic cannot
be considered as a sort of ‘ideology in the second intension’. I intend to accomplish
this by means of a contrast between ‘enjoyment as a political factor’ in ethical life
and ‘enjoyment as an aesthetic factor’ in aesthetic representations.
Zˇizˇek’s position on aesthetics involves bringing Hegel and Freud together by
effectively proposing that the artwork represents “ethical substance” as the social
fantasy. From Hegel, Zˇizˇek takes the idea that aesthetics reflects ethical life in the
medium of figuration, that is, it is a representation of the historically meaningful
social totality through concrete images and particular individuals.54 From Freud,
Zˇizˇek derives the idea that aesthetics is a representation of the fantasy. Freud’s
analysis of Jensen’s Gradiva, for instance, assumes that the work of art evades
censorship just as the dream does, and so represents the satisfaction of a wish.55 Zˇizˇek
adopts both of these perspectives, proposing that art is equally a reflection of ethical
life (a representation of the social agon) and a generalisation of authorial wish-
fulfilment (a representation of the fundamental fantasy). He synthesises these
perspectives through his concept of the ‘sinthome’, or social fantasy. For Zˇizˇek, the
socially symbolic act that the work of art constitutes happens within the social
antagonism of ethical life, rather than as a response to structural transformations,
and specifically, art reflects ethical life through the objectification of the social
fantasy. This necessarily means that it must depict the sinthome (that is, the socially
generalised symptomatic expression of the fantasy generated through adoption of an
Ego Ideal as a collective representation of social ideals) through the actions of a
socially typical character in a plausible shared world.
In Zˇizˇek’s Lacanian terms, art, religion and philosophy are all forms (potentially) of
knowledge of what he calls the ‘non-existence of the big Other’, the cleft in ethical life
as a lack of closure of the Symbolic Order or intersubjective totality. Where Jameson
proposed to pass ‘from national allegory to libidinal apparatus’ (but went instead to
the structural framework),56 Zˇizˇek’s Lacanian theory allows us to grasp the way that
the artwork performs this shift via an evacuation of the representation of ethical life
as an imaginary totality that the master signifier mandates.
By representing ethical substance as social antagonism, art exposes the historical
contingency of the master signifier, or Ego Ideal, and therefore the master signifier’s
inability to reference a complete satisfaction. By simultaneously representing the
parallax
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social fantasy as the frame for social reality (for lived experience), the artwork places
in the same frame an incomplete symbolic totality – I(O) becomes S(Ø) – and the
object of the fantasy, the object (a), as an empty nothingness. Speaking about
ideological analysis, Zˇizˇek describes his methodology in terms of the interpretation
of symptoms and the traversal of the fantasy;57 the point here is that the work of
analysis, made necessary in the field of ideologico-political hegemony by the
presence of repression, is performed by the work of art, albeit in the medium of
figuration rather than conceptuality. This explains two apparently highly
problematic features of Zˇizˇek’s characteristic technique – his supposed reduction
of the artwork to a ‘social symptom’ and his tendency to perform an ‘aesthetic
judgement’ on ideological representations.58 The work of art delivers knowledge of
the social symptom through its representations, but the existence of art is not
symptomatic of alienation; the procedures of art are held to be the model for
ideology critique, rather than this representing an aestheticisation of ideology.
Zˇizˇek’s hermeneutics therefore proceed through the decoding of the social anxiety at
the heart of the text by following the link from the Ego Ideal – I(O) – through to
the object at the heart of the social fantasy. Given the limitations of space, a single
example will have to illustrate Zˇizˇek’s procedure of moving interpretively ‘from
I(O) to (a)’, that is, from the Ego Ideal to the social fantasy, or from Hegel to Freud.
Zˇizˇek considers Hitchcock’s modernist films to be exemplary in their representation of
the sinthome.59 Zˇizˇek considers the Hitchcockian universe to be based on the Jansenist
theology of the hidden God, which is a perfect illustration of the closed totality, of the
Ego Ideal as Imaginary Other, that is the elementary basis of ideology.60 Indeed,
Hitchcock’s films centre on the operations of a blank and pitiless gaze emanating from
radically depersonalised characters or the ubiquitous ‘gigantic stone statues which
appear regularly in his films’61 that hail the protagonist with their (redeemed or
damned) status. ‘This is . . . the theological background ofHitchcock’s universe’, Zˇizˇek
comments, ‘where the heroes are at themercy of theDieu obscur . . . and Fate intervenes
in the guise of a contingent coincidence which radically changes the hero’s symbolic
status’.62
But, Zˇizˇek argues, this (statement of the) blank gaze is ultimately identical with the
camera lens, with the implication that as an enunciation, Hitchcock’s films are self-
reflexive allegories of their own production. Hitchcock enjoys playing the
benevolent-sadistic God figure toying with the viewer’s voyeuristic desire to see
the hero, the protagonist as an object of the Other’s gaze, punished. The
transparency of this process, announced through the allegorical structure of the
films, confronts the ideal viewer with the question of their desire: this is, because of
the viewer’s identification with the protagonist, masochistic, that is, perverse. This is
why ‘the strongest “ideologico-critical” potential of Hitchcock’s films is contained
precisely in their allegorical nature’, because the viewer’s own desire is anticipated
explicitly in the representation of the realisation of desire on screen.63 ‘The shift . . .
at work here’, Zˇizˇek comments, ‘could be defined as the passage from I(O) to object
(a): from gaze as point of symbolic identification to gaze as object’.64
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Symbolic identification involves identification with a social ideal (a master signifier)
that pretends to be universal, that is, which seems to ‘float’ above partisan
involvements as a pure, neutral gaze. By forcing on the viewer the knowledge that
this neutral gaze is in actuality highly partisan, that is, that is it saturated with
enjoyment, the films expose the way in which the formation of a social reality
(a symbolically-structured diegetic universe) depend on libidinal investment in the
supposition of the existence of the big Other. ‘Therein consists Hitchcock’s
elementary strategy’, Zˇizˇek concludes: ‘by means of a reflexive inclusion of his/her
own gaze, the viewer becomes aware of how this gaze of his/hers is always-already
partial, “ideological”, stigmatised by a “pathological” desire’.65 Art is not ideology –
functionally or practically – but the critique of ideology. As Zˇizˇek says, Hitchcock’s
films expose enjoyment, which means that:
The identification which is ‘extraneated’, whose functioning is
suspended, as a result of Hitchcock’s playing with the viewer, is [the
politically effective] identification with transgression. Precisely when
Hitchcock appears at hismost conformist, praising the rule of Law, and
so on, the . . . fundamental identificationwith the ‘transgressive’ mode
of enjoyment which holds a community together . . . is contaminated
beyond cure.66
For Zˇizˇek, then, ‘enjoyment as an aesthetic factor’ means identification with the
social sinthome – the exact reverse of ‘enjoyment as a political factor’, which involves
exclusion (repression) of the social sinthome in identification with the master signifier.
Let us reconsider Jameson’s ‘dialectic of reification and utopia’ from this perspective.
The unconscious is not political, although it provides the ‘stuff ’, the ‘substance’ of
both ethical life and aesthetic works, in the social fantasy as (respectively) repressed
and expressed. What artworks represent is not the structural framework but ethical
life, so that the horizons of interpretation in questionmust be the imaginary/symbolic
and then the symbolic/real of the ‘interpretation of symptoms’ and the ‘traversal of
fantasy’. The implications of an understanding of ‘enjoyment as an aesthetic factor’
are that realism, modernism and postmodernism are modes of the symbolisation of
the unconscious fantasy, rather than allegories of structural transformations. Yet this
rectification of the over-politicisation of the text is not a de-politicisation of culture,
because art is a form of ideology critique that may succumb to ‘reification’, the
personification of things as if they were independent actors. This happens when the
artwork swerves aside from the representation of the social antagonisms of ethical
life, that is, when it substitutes the imaginary totality for an incomplete symbolic
network – S(Ø) regresses to I(O).
Conclusion
The notion of restoring the Hegelian insight into the relation between ethical life and
the artwork is attractive – at least to this author – especially when it can be done in a
way that preserves the historicisation of aesthetics performed by contemporary
forms of Freudo-Marxism, such as that of Fredric Jameson and (in a maverick vein)
parallax
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Slavoj Zˇizˇek. But we have to be careful in all of these theoretical gymnastics not to
miss the point altogether. Perhaps the ‘turn to aesthetics’ is a rallying cry for a de-
politicisation of the text. By framing my response as an inquiry into the ‘specificity of
the aesthetic’ (which implies differentiation within a totality), I have tried to argue
that what is desirable is not de-politicisation but a strong conception of the relative
autonomy of aesthetics and ideology. Within these coordinates, however, we need to
confront the basic intuition that informs resistance to the ‘work of art as political
allegory’ position so characteristic of francophile criticism.
That intuition is that there are more things under heaven and earth than are dreamt
of in contemporary Theory. Specifically, it is the perception that the artwork, as an
elaboration of a whole structure of feeling, has the potential to catalyse cognitive
mapping, ethical regeneration and new perceptions because it speaks to the human
condition in a range of ways that escape the narrow compass of ethico-political
struggles and state power. The work of art speaks to human existence in the natural
world (not just to the material production of social life), to the emotional life of
individuals (and not just to their politicised fantasies), to moral conceptions of
character (and not just to ideologically constructed social subjectivity), and so forth.
The advantage of the late Marxism of Jameson is that it seeks, in its encounter with
Adorno in particular,67 to expand the conceptual range of historical materialism –
through the multi-perspectival idea of dialectical ‘models’ – so as to accommodate
precisely such intuitions, those of Luka´cs, Marcuse, Adorno and Bloch. The concept
of ethical life proposed here is such a model.
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